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UNEXPECTED INEQUALITY: DISPARATE-IMPACT FROM
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE DECISIONS
Sahar Takshi, J.D.
Systemic discrimination in healthcare plagues marginalized groups.
Physicians incorrectly view people of color as having high pain tolerance, leading
to undertreatment. Women with disabilities are often undiagnosed because their
symptoms are dismissed. Low-income patients have less access to appropriate
treatment. These patterns, and others, reflect long-standing disparities that have
become engrained in U.S. health systems.
As the healthcare industry adopts artificial intelligence and algorithminformed (AI) tools, it is vital that regulators address healthcare discrimination. AI
tools are increasingly used to make both clinical and administrative decisions by
hospitals, physicians, and insurers—yet there is no framework that specifically
places nondiscrimination obligations on AI users. The Food & Drug
Administration has limited authority to regulate AI and has not sought to
incorporate anti-discrimination principles in its guidance. Section 1557 of the
Affordable Care Act has not been used to enforce nondiscrimination in healthcare
AI and is under-utilized by the Office of Civil Rights. State level protections by
medical licensing boards or malpractice liability are similarly untested and have
not yet extended nondiscrimination obligations to AI.
This Article discusses the role of each legal obligation on healthcare AI and
the ways in which each system can improve to address discrimination. It highlights
the ways in which industries can self-regulate to set nondiscrimination standards
and concludes by recommending standards and creating a super-regulator to
address disparate impact by AI. As the world moves towards automation, it is
imperative that ongoing concerns about systemic discrimination are removed to
prevent further marginalization in healthcare.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A 2019 study revealed that an algorithm used by UnitedHealth, one of the
nation’s largest managed care organizations, might be violating state and federal
law: The algorithm had a racially discriminatory impact.1 The algorithm (called
“Impact Pro”) makes eligibility determinations for “high risk care management”
services by identifying patients with complex health needs.2 The researchers found
that it deemed black patients’ health needs as “less than” white patients’, and as a
result, black patients were not targeted to benefit from specialized care management
programs.3 Such discriminatory effects from artificial intelligence and augmented
intelligence (AI) are not undocumented;4 however, the study was the first to expose
these effects from automation in the healthcare industry. One can imagine an AI
system that relies on a patient’s oral description of their symptoms to design a
treatment plan, or automated imaging technology that diagnoses skin conditions—
both systems have the potential to discriminate against patients because it has been
proven that AI systems have greater difficulty understanding African American
vernacular and analyzing images of people of color.5
Discrimination in the healthcare industry is not a novel concept. Thirty-five
years ago, then-Secretary Margaret Heckler issued a report and recommendations
based on the findings from the Task Force on Black and Minority health, with the
report’s focal point being minority groups experiencing tremendous amounts of
“excess deaths” compared to their non-minority counterparts.6 Despite the Heckler
1

Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of
Populations, 336 SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019),
https://www.ehidc.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Dissecting%20racial%20bias%20in%20an
%20algorithm%20used%20to%20manage%20the%20health%20of%20populations.pdf.
2

Id.

3

Id.; Isabel F. Farhi, NY Action Against UnitedHealth Algorithm, CONSUMER L. ROUND-UP (Nov.
12, 2019), https://consumer.jenner.com/2019/11/ny-action-against-unitedhealth-algorithm.html.
4

Tom C.V. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 (2019)
(financial industry); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018)
(employment); Karen Hao, AI is sending people to jail—and getting it wrong, MIT TECH. REV.
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai/
(criminal justice system).
5

See generally Cade Metz, There Is a Racial Divide in Speech-Recognition Systems, Researchers
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/speechrecognition-bias-apple-amazon-google.html (reporting that even the best performing AI system
misunderstood 27% of words spoken by Blacks); Larry Hardesty, Study finds gender and skin-type
bias in commercial artificial-intelligence systems, MIT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018),
http://news.mit.edu/2018/study-finds-gender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems0212?mod=article_inline.
6

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S TASK FORCE ON BLACK
& MINORITY HEALTH (1985),
https://archive.org/stream/reportofsecretar00usde#page/10/mode/2up.
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Report’s call to action—increased education and information, professional
development, and research and data gathering—health disparities have persisted.
Racial and ethnic minorities continue to experience higher rates of premature death
and chronic disease. Native Americans and Alaskan natives have higher rates of
infant mortality, and black patients are more likely to be inaccurately deemed as
having high pain tolerance.7 From a healthcare entity’s perspective, healthcare AI
presents a significant compliance challenge issue because of the risk of
discrimination and relevant regulations (or lack thereof).
The introduction of AI-informed decision making into the healthcare sphere
will continue to exacerbate many of these inequities, and possibly introduce new
ones (e.g., in diagnosis and treatment decisions). The promise of AI as a more
consistent, and even more accurate, decisionmaker means automation is likely to
become the standard in healthcare, but should these positives outweigh its
discriminatory impact? This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, this Article
will outline the current and prospective uses of AI in healthcare and provide
examples of potential discriminatory effects. Part II discusses the Food & Drug
Administration’s current efforts to regulate AI used in medical settings, particularly
as clinical decision supports. This Part also highlights the gaps in regulations and
makes recommendations to bolster the agency’s role in fighting healthcare
discrimination. Part III will introduce Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act and
argue that this nondiscrimination provision alone is inadequate to prevent or
remedy disparate-impact from AI-informed decisions by providers and insurers
beginning by describing the Department of Health and Human Service’s
enforcement of Section 1557, and further making recommendations for covered
entities as they develop their compliance programs to address AI based on these
enforcement actions. It then discusses the limited possibility of private rights of
action for plaintiffs who are disparately impacted by healthcare AI. Part IV
describes the novel compliance challenges posed by licensing laws and malpractice
liability doctrines in relation to healthcare AI. Finally, Part V introduces
recommendations for the healthcare industry to develop internal compliance
standards and for regulators to promulgate policies that address biases in healthcare
AI.

7

NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., COMMUNITIES IN ACTION: PATHWAYS TO HEALTH
EQUITY (James N. Weinstein et al. eds., 2017); Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial bias in pain
assessment and treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological differences
between blacks and whites, 113 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 4296, 4300
(2016), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/16/4296.full.pdf. The 2020 COVID-19 outbreak
has exposed yet another pitfall in health equity in the United States, with many low-income
individuals being unable to access treatment due to lack of insurance coverage and inability to
practice social-distancing as a precautionary measure due to hourly employment without paid sick
leave. See also Royce Dunmore, How Coronavirus Affects Black People: Civil Rights Groups Call
Out Racial Health Disparities, NEWSONE (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://newsone.com/3911611/coronavirus-affects-black-people-civil-rights-groups-racial-healthdisparities/.
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II.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE

A. How is Artificial Intelligence Used in the Healthcare Industry?
AI refers to a broad subset of computer sciences where machines are
capable of making decisions that are typically made by humans.8 Other industries
use AI for decisions such as public-benefits eligibility determinations, risk–threat
analysis, and employment recruitment efforts. In the healthcare industry, AI is
increasingly being used for both administrative decisions and clinical decisions.
Some examples include:
● Administrative decisions (e.g., making appointments, billing,
reimbursement requests);
● Custodial (e.g., driverless vehicles to pull laundry, food services, clean
rooms, automated pharmacy, cross-check travel conditions);
● Medical applications and wearables;
● Caregiving (“robotic” cribs, voice companions, electric lifts);
● Research and education;
● Clinical data analytics;
● Imaging, pathology, and radiology (e.g., detecting cancers, stroke,
pneumonia, analyzing x-rays and scans);
● Predictive diagnosis (i.e., clinical decision supports); and
● Procedural AI (e.g., “tiny robots injected into the body for targeted drug
delivery as an alternative to surgery”).9
AI is increasingly being used to make clinical determinations, such as to
diagnose skin cancer10 or recommend a combination of chemotherapy for cancer
patients.11 It can be used to determine individual patients’ risk of deteriorating,
which allows physicians to predict which patients are likely to need to be
transferred to the intensive care unit and intervene before a clinical emergency,
increasing the rate of survival.12 Tools like reSET-O (created by Pear Therapeutics)
8

Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA passes first policy recommendation on augmented
intelligence (June 14, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-passesfirst-policy-recommendations-augmented-intelligence (The American Medical Association’s 2018
policy recommendation prefers the term “augmented intelligence.”).
9

Nicolas Terry, Of Regulating Healthcare AI and Robots, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 133, 144–47
(2019).
10

Adewole S. Adamson & Avery Smith, Machine Learning and Health Care Disparities in
Dermatology, 154 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 1247 (2018).
11

See Robert Pearl, Artificial Intelligence In Healthcare: Separating Reality From Hype, FORBES
(Mar. 13, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2018/03/13/artificialintelligence-in-healthcare/#7970d46b1d75.
12

See id.
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treats opioid-use disorders with cognitive behavioral therapy through a mobile
application.13 Digital therapeutics created by Akili Interactive Labs work to treat or
improvement cognitive impairments, such as ADHD, major depressive disorder,
autism spectrum disorders, and multiple sclerosis through interactive digital
therapies—similar to videogames.14 Before proceeding, it is important to clarify
that currently even when AI is used in healthcare for clinical purposes, “the
physician, not the AI, has primacy.”15
Similarly, AI can be used to make administrative decisions outside of the
examination or operating room. Managed care organizations use AI to prioritize
risks in patients, allocate resources effectively, and allow physicians to intervene in
patient care before health (and costs) skyrocket in critical situations.16 AI can be
used to automate medical billing—a task that is tedious, time consuming, and prone
to errors when done manually.17 AI also has the potential to further help providers
make better clinical decisions—for example by informing physicians whether a
patient is adhering to his or her therapy, and their response to that therapy.18
The risks of disparate-impact on suspect classes arising from AI-informed
decision making should be of concern to healthcare providers, hospitals and clinics,
and insurers. As these entities update their compliance and ethics programs to
include factors such as privacy and fraud and abuse violations related to healthcare
AI, they should also include nondiscrimination principles. Just like AI, an effective
compliance program is a dynamic and constantly evolving system. The remainder
of this Article will include discussions on how healthcare entities can incorporate
nondiscrimination standards into their written policies and procedures, compliance
auditing and investigation, training and education, and remediation procedures.
13

Press Release, Pear Therapeutics, Sandoz Inc. and Pear Therapeutics Obtain FDA Clearance for
reSET-OTM to Treat Opioid Use Disorder (Dec. 10, 2018), https://peartherapeutics.com/sandozinc-and-pear-therapeutics-obtain-fda-clearance-for-reset-o-to-treat-opioid-use-disorder/.
14

Getting to the root of cognitive impairment, AKILI INTERACTIVE LABS,
https://www.akiliinteractive.com/science-and-technology (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
15

Terry, supra note 9, at 137.

16

Paul Nicolaus, How Will AI Factor into the Future of Managed Care Markets, 16 FIRST REPORT
MANAGED CARE (Feb. 2019), https://www.managedhealthcareconnect.com/articles/how-will-aifactor-future-managed-care-markets; Rachael Zimlich, Real-World Applications of Artificial
Intelligence in Healthcare, MANAGED CARE EXECUTIVE (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/article/real-world-applications-artificialintelligence-healthcare (“[C]ertain artificial intelligence tools that interact with patients may also
allow us to measure adherence and pill-taking behavior in real-time so we can identify changes in
behavior immediately instead of after-the-fact.”).
17

John Bailey, Artificial Intelligence & Healthcare: Rethinking Medical Billing, CHETU,
https://www.chetu.com/blogs/healthcare/ai-and-healthcare-medical-billing.php (last visited Mar.
16, 2020).
18

Zimlich, supra note 16.
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B. UnitedHealth as a Cautionary Tale: Biases in AI and Resulting
Discrimination
A recent study found that an algorithm used by U.S. health systems
(UnitedHealth Group) has been discriminating against black patients. This
algorithm, created by Optum, was used to identify the most high-risk patients to
inform allocation of funds in the healthcare system. The algorithm used health care
costs to make its predictions; however, spending for black patients is lower than for
white patients due to “unequal access to care.”19 These historic racial disparities in
access to care translated into a racial bias in the algorithm—as a result, only 17.7%
of black patients were identified as high-risk, but the study estimates that the true
number should have been 46.5%.20 In a letter to UnitedHealth, New York officials
stated: “By relying on historic spending to triage and diagnose current patients,
your algorithm appears to inherently prioritize white patients who have had greater
access to healthcare than black patients.”21 The racial bias in Optum’s algorithm
not only presents a discrimination problem (in the form of disparate-impact), but
can also harm individual patients in that it hinders physicians from not intervening
in advance of a medical crisis.
Discrimination as a result of biases in AI is well-documented in other
fields,22 but the UnitedHealth case study is the only publicly available evidence of
such effects in the health care context.23 Scholars suspect that the discriminatory
19

Obermeyer et al., supra note 1, at 447–48 (noting that while healthcare costs and medical needs
are generally correlated (“sicker patients need and receive more care, on average”), deviations
arise from health disparities: lack of healthcare insurance, resulting from geography,
transportation, and job demands, and “taste-based” discrimination (e.g., white physicians not
recommending preventative care to black patients).
20

Id. at 449.

21

Letter from Linda Lacewell, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., and Howard A.
Zucker, Comm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to David S. Wichmann, CEO, UnitedHealth Group
Inc. (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/20191025160637.pdf (responding to the
Obermeyer study and stating that UnitedHealth may not “produce, rely on, or promote an
algorithm that has a discriminatory effect.”) [hereinafter NY Letter to UnitedHealth].
22

See Soniya Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 54, 71 (2019) (LGBTQ+ individuals in targeted ads); McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big
Data: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices,
71 ARK. L. REV. 529, 540–43 (2018) (women and racial minorities in hiring algorithms); Kristilian
Lum & Wiliam Isaac, To predict and to serve?, SIGNIFICANCE MAGAZINE 1 (Oct. 2016),
https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.17409713.2016.00960.x?shared_access_token=IDAY641RsV7xsRV6B1hl04ta6bR2k8jH0KrdpFOxC6
77Uo2ZpRJGfPu343uxAHkqNhmTYCA7Luw6h3KOpptkCw153jVJOMXzw25e_4e82JLu75RVoBQza76WyvWFk7BJN2b0K0jzwfXRgYNqUDbybnAVsHSC6KhR9WXrKYTMY%3D (racial bias in predictive policing).
23

States, however, are aware of this effect. See, e.g., NY Letter to UnitedHealth, supra note 21, at
2 (noting that New York Governor Cuomo had already created a plan to combat racially
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effects of AI will seep into the healthcare realm as well.24 A major barrier to
analyzing the frequency and magnitude of discrimination and physical harm
resulting from AI is the proprietary nature of the algorithms.25 Without more
research, it is impossible to estimate the extent of biases in healthcare AIs outside
of UnitedHealth; however, research from other industries is a good place to start.
The human-like decision making capacity of AI is developed by first
introducing a training data-set—i.e., historical data that the AI uses to detect
patterns and make future predictions.26 One way that bias can enter into an AI
system is unintentional lack of diversity in the training dataset. For example, visual
AI tools have been shown to display racial and gender disparities: A facial
recognition AI software was unable to accurately identify over one-third of black
women in a photo lineup (notably, the algorithm was trained on a majority male
and white dataset).27 Voice-recognition systems show similar “race gaps,” tools
created by companies such as Microsoft and Apple are unable to understand speech
by black people.28 The UnitedHealth case-study reflects how such invisible biases
in training data can disparately impact certain groups; not only might some patients
be excluded from special programs or preventative-measures, but physicians might
fail to diagnose certain patients who have been under-diagnosed historically. The
same problem is likely to arise when AI is trained not just on historical data, but on
data from research. The fact that women and minorities are frequently excluded
from medical research means that any AI based on such research may not be fully
representative of healthcare consumers.29
disparities in mortality rates by creating the Maternal Review Board and making recommendations
to the Department of Health).
24

See Sharona Hoffman, What Genetic Testing Teaches About Predictive Health Analytics, 98
N.C. L. REV. 123 (2019) (suggesting that AI in genetic testing may erroneously conclude that
some women are at a higher risk for various health problems and disproportionately identify
patients with criminal records as being high risk).
25

See Obermeyer et al., supra note 1, at 447.

26

The potential biases discussed in this section are not only errors in the original dataset, they
continue to amplify at every stage of the AI’s decision-making process. See Katyal, supra note 22,
at 67–68 (“Errors at any stage can become amplified in the next stage, producing deviant
outcomes in complex, troubling and sometimes difficult-to-detect ways.”).
27

Hardesty, supra note 5. In fact, many of the AI systems that have been cleared by the Food &
Drug Administration have been visual or scanning AI tools—e.g., Contact (identifies symptoms of
stroke), IDx-DR (identifies diabetic retinopathy), and Accipio (identifies intracranial hemorrhage).
See David Muoio, Roundup: 12 healthcare algorithms cleared by the FDA, MOBILE HEALTH
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/roundup-12-healthcarealgorithms-cleared-fda.
28

Metz, supra note 5 (“This indicates that the problem lies in the way the systems are trained to
recognize sound.”).
29

See Dhruv Khullar, A.I. Could Worsen Health Disparities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/opinion/ai-bias-healthcare.html.
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In the criminal-justice system, AI is used to determine the likelihood of
crime in certain neighborhoods and the predictions are then used by police stations
to intervene in crimes. Unsurprisingly, this use of AI can lead to confirmation bias
that perpetuates racial disparities—police continue to target communities of color
for drug use because the algorithm seems to be correct (despite the fact that drug
use is equal across races).30 The algorithm does not determine where crime is
actually likely to occur, but rather where police is likely to detect the crime based
on where they have detected them previously. These engrained stereotypes and the
related confirmation bias can lead to similar challenges in the healthcare system—
for example, an AI system might assume that low-income patients are less likely to
adhere to their treatment plans, leading physicians not to focus on those patients.31
Similarly, it could lead to overdiagnosis of conditions among certain populations,32
which may also result in inequitable insurance rates.33
Depending on the use, the developers may intentionally exclude outlier data
when they create AI. For example, Google may exclude or minimize a “minority
interpretation of a search term” in its search results algorithm because it would not
“help Google show relevant ads, generate clicks or produce revenue on a mass
scale.”34 One could easily imagine a healthcare system excluding an outlier patient,
for example with a rare disability or underrepresented ethnic group, from its AI
tool. What effect would this have when a future patient with those characteristics
enters the hospital system? If the AI is a clinical tool, would it lead to a misdiagnosis
because the AI could not detect the rare disease? If the AI is an administrative tool,
would it lead to fewer resources being allocated to that patient because the AI
underestimated the costliness of treating that patient?35
30

See Lum & Isaac, supra note 22, at 5.

31

Alternatively, given the recent shift towards value-based care, physicians might instead focus
more on those patients. This dichotomy reflects a key challenge with AI in healthcare: Does the
responsibility for and liability from decision-making lie with the AI or with the provider? This
issue will be explored more in Part IV.B (Malpractice Liability).
32

Effy Vayena, Machine learning in medicine: Addressing ethical challenge, 15 PLOS MED.
(2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002689 (“[I]n
population data biased by the entrenched overdiagnosis of schizophrenia in African Americans.”).
33

See Katyal, supra note 22, at 96 (noting that health insurers can charge higher premiums based
on irrelevant characteristics).
34

Id. at 69–70.

35

Another form of discrimination can arise not from the AI making decisions, but the information
that the AI collects which is later shared with other entities. Healthcare data in particular is very
valuable. See CHRIS WAYMAN & NATASHA HUNERIACH, REALISING THE VALUE OF HEALTH CARE
DATA: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE 2 (2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/eycom/en_gl/topics/life-sciences/life-sciences-pdfs/ey-value-of-health-care-data-v20-final.pdf
(noting that the 55 million patient records held by the UK’s National Health Service are valued at
£5 billion, or just over $6 billion USD). Providers and insurers have an incentive to sell the nonindividually identifiable information that the AI learns through its decision-making for profit. Any
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The possible biases described in this section reflect more than just errors in
an algorithm, they indicate the potential for real harm to patients—such as physical
harm (in the form of failed, delayed, or misdiagnosis, and inappropriate treatment)
and social harm (in the form of inequitable billing, insurance rates, and coverage,
and perpetuating stereotypes based on over-diagnosis). An analogy from Quartz
magazine is apt: “Algorithms are like drugs,” they affect lives (i.e., have significant
impact on the people/patients), perform differently on different demographics (i.e.,
algorithmic bias), and can have side effects (i.e., intended or unintended effects as
a result of bias).36 Unlike prescription drugs, however, healthcare AI is largely
unregulated, meaning healthcare entities have few legal obligations to comply with
(especially in terms of disparate-impact analysis) and patients have little legal
recourse.
III.

AGENCY OVERSIGHT OF HEALTHCARE AI

A. Food & Drug Administration’s Current Approach to AI
Despite the increased use of healthcare AI, there is little regulation of the
emerging technology. Federal agencies, state medical boards, and trade
organizations have only just begun to address the fate of this new technology. The
Food & Drug Administration (FDA) has authority to regulate a medical device,
which is “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent, or other similar related article” recognized as a pharmaceutical, used
for diagnosis or treatment, or intended to affect the structure or function of the
body.37 The 21st Century Cures Act, significantly limited the FDA’s ability to
regulate AI; devices that support or provide recommendations to a healthcare
professional, and the healthcare professional has the opportunity to “independently
review the basis for such recommendation” are excluded from the definition of
device.38 Notably, the FDA does not have the statutory authority to regulate devices
biases that exist in that data can result in discrimination in whatever context the sold data is used
(regardless of whether it resulted in discrimination in the AI’s original purpose). For example, an
algorithm that over-estimated patients’ propensity for a certain illness at a community hospital, if
sold, may result in life-insurance carriers charging higher premiums for people from that
community. Although this paper will not discuss this in depth, the GDPR model used in European
nations could protect against this form of second-degree discrimination. See Katyal, supra note 22,
at 106–07 (noting that the GDPR model “requires individuals to have the right to confirm whether
their personal data is being processed, the purpose of the process, the source of the data, and the
logic behind any automated process”).
36

Andy Coravos et al., We should treat algorithms like prescription drugs, QUARTZ (Feb. 14,
2019), https://qz.com/1540594/treating-algorithms-like-prescription-drugs-could-reduce-ai-bias/.
37

21 U.S.C. § 321 (2018).

38

21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-225, § 3060(a), 130 Stat. 1033 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 520(o)(E)(ii)–(iii)). Specifically, the Act excludes devices that meet these criteria
from the definition of medical device: (1) not intended to analyze medical images or signals from
in vitro diagnostic devices or analyze a pattern from signal acquisition systems; (2) intended to be
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that are used as “administrative support[s],” such as billing and analyzing
population level data.39 The FDA follows different processes to provide clearance
or approval prior to marketing of a device based on its class;40 medical devices are
reviewed under different standards (e.g., premarket clearance (510(k)), De Novo
classification, or premarket approval) that highlight the risk to patients.41
The agency’s regulatory framework, created in a pre-AI era, does not
directly address AI technology, but the agency has developed guidance and a
proposed a framework in the last two years. The FDA has previously regulated
software as a medical device (SaMD)—i.e., “software intended to be used for one
or more medical purposes that perform these purposes without being part of a
hardware medical device.”42 Examples of SaMD include fertility apps that track
reproductive outcomes and software that allows physicians and patients to view
MRI results on smartphones.43 The FDA has issued guidance regulating SaMD, and
a proposed regulatory framework for AI and machine-learning SaMDs.44 These
used to display, analyze or print patient medical information (or information from clinical studies);
(3) intended to support or give recommendations to healthcare professionals about preventing,
diagnosing, or treating diseases; and (4) intended to be independently reviewed by a healthcare
professional (as opposed to professional primarily relying on the recommendations).
39

See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(A) (providing in
relevant part, “[t]he term device . . . shall not include a software function that is intended for
administrative support of a health care facility, including the processing and maintenance of
financial records, claims or billing information, appointment schedules, business analytics;
information about patient populations, admissions, practice and inventory management, analysis
of historical claims data to predict future utilization or cost-effectiveness, determination of health
benefit eligibility, population health management, and laboratory workflow . . .).
40

Floor Van Leeuwen, A 101 guide to the FDA-regulatory process for AI healthcare software
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.quantib.com/blog/a-101-guide-to-the-fda-regulatory-process-for-airadiology-software (explaining that class I and II are relatively low-patient risk products, whereas
class III are products that sustain or support life, are implanted, or present a potential unreasonable
risk of injury to the patient) [hereinafter FDA Regulatory Process for AI].
41

Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Software as a Medical Device, FDA.GOV,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-andmachine-learning-software-medical-device (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
42

Id. (explaining that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines medical purpose as those
intended to treat, diagnose, mitigate, or prevent disease or other conditions).
43

See Evan Heier, SaMD: Everything You Need to Know About Software as a Medical Device,
SELECTHUB (Sept. 30 , 2019), https://www.selecthub.com/medical-software/software-medicaldevice-samd/ (noting that software that “principally drive[s] a hardware device,” such as the
software that enables the MRI to work, is not SaMD).
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U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): CLINICAL
EVALUATION GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/media/100714/download [hereinafter SAMD GUIDANCE]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING [AI/ML]-BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE [SAMD]
DISCUSSION PAPER AND REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK, https://www.fda.gov/media/122535/download
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documents focus on SaMD manufacturer’s responsibility to test for the validity of
clinical associations (i.e., accuracy, reliability, and precision) and provide a detailed
framework for evaluating for safety, effectiveness and performance; yet these
documents do not provide robust guidance (or create obligations) for detecting and
remedying discrimination.45
In 2019, the FDA’s Digital Health program released the Digital Health
Innovation Action Plan.46 The Plan recognized that
FDA’s traditional approach . . . is not well suited for the faster
iterative design, development, and type of validation used for
software-based medical technologies. Traditional implementation
of the premarket requirements may impede or delay patient access
to critical evolutions of software technology, particularly those
presenting a lower risk to patients.47
Notably, the Digital Health Program developed policies and approaches to
balance the benefits and risks to patients—one such approach was to not enforce
compliance for “low risk” technologies so that they are readily available to
consumers.48 This begs the question: Did the FDA consider disparate-impact on
vulnerable populations in making such risk assessments? Most importantly, the
FDA stated its intent to develop a pre-certification program that “could replace the
need for a premarket submission for certain products and allow for decreased
submission content and/or faster review of the marketing submission for other
products.”49 The pre-cert program would regulate the developer rather than the
product. The agency could pre-certify developers that “demonstrate a culture of
quality and organizational excellence based on objective criteria.”50 Such criteria
can include excellent software design, development, or validation and testing, and
the pre-certified developers could market low-risk devices without additional
review (or at least less rigorous review). FDA accepted nine companies to

(adopting international industry principles created by the International Medical Device Regulators
Forum (IMDRF)).
45

SAMD GUIDANCE, supra note 44, at 4, 7, 12. For example, the Guidance requires clinical
evaluation to be “iterative and continuous” and include independent review.
46

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DIGITAL HEALTH INNOVATION ACTION PLAN (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/106331/download.
47

Id. at 2.

48

Id. at 2–3 (stating that FDA did not focus oversight or enforce compliance for low-risk mobile
apps; technologies that only transmit, store, or data; and products that only promote general
wellness).
49

Id. at 5.

50

Id.
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participate in the Pre-Cert pilot program in August 2017.51 It stated in the NPRM
that one factor in eligibility for the program is measured on “Key Performance
Indicators” or similar measures but made no specific mention of nondiscrimination
measures.
Recently, the FDA released a draft guidance around Clinical Decision
Support (CDS) software—software that includes computerized alerts for patients
and providers, condition-specific order sets, diagnostic support, and more.52 The
CDS guidance specifically applies to such software that make patient-specific
recommendations to a health care provider, such as possible diagnosis,
recommended treatment plans, and recommended diagnostic tests.53 Key to this
definition is that the CDS function must not be independently reviewed by a
healthcare provider (labelled “Device CDS”).54 A healthcare AI can escape FDA
enforcement under the guidance (labelled “Non-Device CDS”) if the manufacturer
provides a plain-language description of the software (including the intended use
and intended user), the data inputs required to generate a recommendation (e.g.,
patient’s age), and the basis for the recommendation.55 To adequately describe the
basis-for-recommendation, the guidance requires software developers to “describe
the underlying data used to develop the algorithm and [] include plain language
descriptions of the logic or rationale used by the algorithm to render a
recommendation.”56 Even for those Device CDSs that the FDA has authority to
regulate, the agency stated it intends to focus enforcement efforts on “serious or
critical situations or conditions” where the provider is unable to independently
review the Device CDS’s recommendation—e.g., machine-learning algorithms that
categorize symptoms of flus, software that identifies signs of opioid addiction, and
51

Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan for Digital Health Devises; Software Precertification Pilot
Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 35,216, 35,217 (July 28, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR2017-07-28/pdf/2017-15891.pdf (noting that nine companies were selected to participate in the
pilot: Apple, Fitbit, Johnson & Johnson, Pear Therapeutics, Phosphorus, Roche, Samsung,
Tidepool, and Verily); Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, FDA.GOV,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/digital-health-software-precertification-precert-program (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
52

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 5 (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/109618/download [hereinafter CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE]. The guidance
clarifies that CDS are different from SaMD in that they are only intended to be used as a support
by providing recommendations, rather than providers relying primarily on the CDS
recommendations.
53

Id. at 6–7, 11. In line with the 21st Century Cures Act, the CDS guidance addresses software
that is not excluded from the definition of medical device (i.e., software that provides heath
recommendations about prevention, diagnoses, or treatment without an opportunity for
independent review by a physician).
54

See 21st Century Cures Act, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 12.
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machine learning algorithms that identify diabetics at risk of post-operative
cardiovascular difficulties.57

B. Barriers and Improvements to the FDA’s Approach
The nature of the FDA’s oversight of AI technology creates certain
compliance challenges for providers and AI developers, and leaves patients at risk
of discrimination. First, the lack of enforced regulations or guidance at this time
means there is little accountability for the AI developers to ensure that algorithms
and software do not perpetuate biases.58
Second, the patchwork of guidance and proposed regulatory frameworks
leaves several gaps in the enforcement around AI. Most importantly, FDA
regulation authority is limited to medical devices—those that play a role in
diagnosis and treatment of disease—they can never extend to AI used for
administrative purposes, which can have an equally discriminatory impact on
healthcare consumers.59 This caveat in the statutory language leaves a large hole in
terms of enforcement authority; absent amendments to the statute, the FDA will
never be able to regulate biases in insurance-rating AI or AI used to identify social
determinants of health.
Furthermore, the added caveats introduced by the 21st Century Cures Act
leave a large portion of healthcare AI technology unregulated. Per the Act and the
FDA’s draft guidance document, Non-Device CDSs are those technologies where
physicians maintain primacy and manufacturers ensure transparency (e.g., by
describing the algorithm’s rationale).60 As discussed in Part IV, a method of
countering AI bias is to require information about its design, testing, and rationale
to be available to providers and patients.61 There is clearly tension between the
FDA’s approach and what researchers and advocates agree is a necessary step to
limit the discriminatory effects of AI bias. It seems that the FDA will not be able to
regulate healthcare AI if the manufacturers provide even limited opportunity for

57

Id. at 14, 23. Similarly, it will focus regulatory oversight over CDS’s intended for patients that
conducts continuous glucose monitoring, assess patient’s stress/anxiety to provide treatment
recommendations, or providers recommendations to caregivers of children with cystic fibrosis
about when to bring the child to the ER.
58

See generally id. at 14 (noting at the top of the CDS guidance document “Contains Nonbinding
Recommendations”) (emphasis added).
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Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(A).
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CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 12.
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See IEEE, infra note 151 and accompanying text.

228

physicians to exercise independent judgement by giving cursory descriptions of the
AI rationale.62
The FDA also specifically noted in its draft CDS guidance that it does not
intend to enforce compliance for devices that inform providers for “non-serious
situations or conditions” such as recommendations for allergens and common cold
symptoms, alerts for cholesterol management, or recommendations of over-thecounter drugs.63 Even for those Device CDSs that the FDA can regulate, it will only
regulate a small percentage. Although the “serious situations and conditions” that
the FDA plans to focus its attention present a higher risk of medical harm, even
low-risk conditions have a high likelihood of discrimination if AI is used. Bias does
not distinguish between high-risk and low-risk diseases, even something as simple
as an AI that recommends over-the-counter medication can cause unnecessary pain
if the AI tends to not recommend the medication to certain individuals.
Lastly, none of the FDA’s proposed frameworks adequately address the
potential for disparate impacts on certain groups, which is a missed opportunity to
ensure that AI developers incorporate nondiscrimination elements (e.g., through
feedback loops) at the design and production stage. In the limited instances where
the FDA does plan to regulate Device CDS, it is likely that its focus will be
primarily on safety and effectiveness rather than AI bias.64 While the Digital Health
Innovation Action Plan seeks a “culture of quality” among AI developers in the
proposed pre-certification program, it still fails to specifically address
discrimination.65 The FDA should include in its pre-certification criterion a
requirement that manufacturers must attest to factors like commitment to
nondiscrimination, review of training data for bias, and testing for disparate-impact.
Not only is there a regulatory gap, but also a compliance gap. Ordinarily,
organizations develop their compliance programs around federal and state
regulations; where technology is just emerging and the government has not yet
caught up, organizations may find it difficult to identify the appropriate standards
to which they should hold themselves. Similar dilemmas are arising in other
industries where AI is emerging, such as the criminal justice system. California
recently introduced a bill to regulate the use of AI in pretrial risk-assessment tools
used by courts in place of bond hearings that received responses from several
advocacy groups with recommendations of specific measures to reduce the risk of
62

See CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 12 (providing an example that a physician would
be unable exercise independent judgement where the information provided by the manufacturer
“could not be expected to be independently understood”).
63

Id. at 20–21. Similarly, it does not intend to enforce regulations against devices where the
patient has primacy to make decisions (such as to take allergy medication recommended by the
CDS).
64

See generally Elias Mallis, An Introduction to FDA’s Regulation of Medical Devices, FDA.GOV,
https://www.fda.gov/media/123602/download (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
65

DIGITAL HEALTH INNOVATION ACTION PLAN, supra note 46, at 5.
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bias.66 In the absence of regulation around healthcare AI, providers, hospitals, and
AI developers should take a cautious approach –limit AI to technology that has
been tested for equality and its use to situations where risk of bias is lowest.
Healthcare AI instruments should be designed so that no patient of a suspect
class is unduly burdened by its errors. There are several measures of fairness that
the FDA should require AI developers to use during design and testing, including
error rate balance and predictive parity.67 The agency should look for a combination
of such measures that is most apt to avoid discrimination.68 The FDA, and AI
developers and healthcare entities, should remain open to input from the
community (such as advocacy groups) and independent data to identify the best
fairness measures.69 In the context of pretrial risk-assessment tools, advocacy
groups in this context argue that “the design of any tool should always give far
greater weight to the avoidance of false positives than to the avoidance of false
negatives” because the detriment of erroneously detaining a person is worse than
erroneously releasing one.70 In the context of healthcare AI, however, the risks are
less clear—is it a greater threat to the health and safety of patients to not diagnose
an illness at all or to misdiagnose it as something else? Medical professionals
should carefully consider and balance these risks to inform AI design and
organization policies and procedures to ensure that risks (particularly risks arising
out of bias) are mitigated to the fullest extent possible. Relatedly, the datasets used
to train AI must be vetted for correctness and reliability.
Advocacy groups in the risk-threat context suggest “transparent and
periodic examination” of relevant factors—in the healthcare context, this might
include review of timely diagnoses, treatment success and adherence, and
rehospitalization rates by race, age, gender, and disability.71 Although there are
currently no regulations, AI developers and healthcare entities can develop their
own internal criterion to achieve transparency.72 Implementing such internal
66

See THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL
RIGHTS CONCERNS 3, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-AssessmentFull.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2020) [hereinafter STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS].
67

See id. at 3. Other methods of algorithmic fairness include: Fairness through blindness (i.e.,
exclusion of factors related to protected class); Group Fairness; Statistical Parity; Equal Group
Error Rates (the rate of false negatives and positives is the same for all groups); Individual
Fairness (same outcome regardless of patient’s group); Predictive Parity (equalized positive
predictive values); and Similarity Measures (classifications based on similar characteristics
relevant to a particular task). See Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact
Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 91 (2017–18).
68

See STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, supra note 66, at 3.
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See id.
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See id. at 4.
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See id. at 4–5.
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See id. at 7. These factors will be discussed in Part IV Recommendations.
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controls will ensure that the healthcare industry is prepared to immediately adapt
to any regulations promulgated by the FDA (or other agencies) in the future.
IV.

UNTESTED WATERS: THE ROLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION IN
HEALTHCARE AI

Discriminatory effects from AI in other industries may be governed by
federal nondiscrimination laws. For example, administrative agencies are
increasingly using AI to make eligibility determinations for public benefits.73
Where constitutionally protected property interests are at stake, the use of AI may
present a procedural due process problem due to the lack of transparency (which
affects the meaningful opportunity to challenge).74 Where AI intentionally treats
persons differently based on factors such as race or gender, the Equal Protection
Clause may apply.75 Similarly, facially neutral policies that disparately impact
certain populations may run afoul the disparate-impact provisions of civil rights
statutes. For example, employers frequently use machine-learning tools for resume
screening, hiring and retention decisions, and identifying employees for
promotions. Where employees and prospective employees have been discriminated
against by these tools, they may pursue specific causes of action per disparateimpact (and business necessity) principles of Title VII.76
These remedies, however, do not extend to any discrimination resulting
from the use of AI in the healthcare context. There is no constitutional property
right to receive, for example, a correct diagnosis or specific treatment plan.
Similarly, there is no such right to coverage for certain services and items or to be
selected to participate in special health programs. Thus, when covered entities use
AI to diagnose, treatment, and monitor patients, or in billing and utilization review,

73

Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision-Making In The
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017).
74

But see id. at 1186 (arguing that the use of algorithms in public benefits determinations is
actually more likely to survive the Mathews balancing-test for procedural due process because it is
perceived to reduce human prejudice).
75

However, facially neutral laws or regulations that have a disparate impact on suspect classes are
insufficient to trigger the Equal Protection Clause. See Interview by Leslie Garfield Tenzer with
Emily Gold Waldman, Dean, Pace L. Sch. (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://lawtofact.buzzsprout.com/138309/1027580-the-equal-protection-clause-and- (explaining
that there needs to be both disparate impact and a showing of intent behind a facially neutral law
to trigger heightened review).
76

Raub, supra note 22, at 544–53. Moreover, federal agencies using AI could also pose a
nondelegation issue under Article I of the Constitution. See generally Coglianese & Lehr, supra
note 73, at 1178 (noting that, although broad delegation to administrative agencies has been a
long-accepted practice of Congress, “the law has always assumed that the recipient of that
authority would be a human being”).
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constitutional protections may not apply.77 The lack of protections and remedies for
affected patients is not only due to the fact that our “statutory and constitutional
schemes are poorly crafted to address issues of private, algorithmic discrimination”
but also because the black-box effect created by the proprietary nature of such
algorithms makes it difficult for patients to discover such effects.78
While most aspects of healthcare are not constitutionally protected, one
federal statute does shield patients from discrimination: Section 1557 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).79 Section 1557 is the
nondiscrimination provision that prohibits certain health systems from
discriminating against patients on the basis of race, sex, national origin, disability
and other characteristics.80 It provides that:
[A]n individual shall not . . . be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any
health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal
financial assistance, . . . or under any program or activity that is
administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established
under this title.81
Section 1557 applies to any health program or activity, any part of which
receives federal financial assistance, is administered by a federal agency, or is
established under the ACA—this includes not only physicians and hospitals, but

77

Katyal, supra note 22, at 99 (“Like the civil rights era that came before it, AI is implicated
within a vast array of decisions that come, not from the government, but from the private sector,
even if many of them implicate civil rights in the process. For example, the right to be considered
for employment, free from consideration of one's disability--the right at issue in the Kyle Behm
case just discussed--directly correlates to the right to work. Similarly, the right to an education, the
right to vote, the right to make contracts, the right to travel, the right to get insurance, and the right
to receive information, among others, are all at issue when an algorithm makes its (private)
decisions about who does and who does not receive the entitlement and the conditions attached to
it. Those decisions are not always subject to public oversight. And even more problematically,
they may be shielded from view, due to trade secrecy and systemic opacity.”).
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See id. at 100 (noting further that these effects from the lack of transparency pose issues in nonprivate industries as well, for example discovering Fourth Amendment violations when AI is used
as a predictive policing tool).
79

See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018). While other federal nondiscrimination statutes exist, they are
not sweeping enough to cover all discrimination in all industries. See, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross
BlueShield of Tennessee, 926 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting in dicta that the Americans with
Disabilities Act may not actually protect those covered by private insurance). For a discussion on
why Title VI of the Civil Rights Act has been ineffective in preventing discrimination by federally
funded healthcare entities, see Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil
Rights, Health Reform, Race and Equity, 55 HOWARD L.J. 855, 860–70 (2012).
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42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
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also insurers.82 These entities are prohibited from excluding an individual from
participating in or receiving the benefits, or otherwise discriminating against an
individual, on the grounds prohibited under: (1) Title VI of the Civil Rights of 1964,
(2) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, (3) the Age Discrimination Act
of 1975, or (4) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Stated simply, the statute and
regulations implementing Section 1557 prohibit health entities from discriminating
against patients on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, age, or disability.
A. Section 1557: Enforcement
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) within the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services is tasked with implementing and enforcing Section 1557. OCR
receives complaints about Section 1557 violations and conducts “compliance
reviews” to investigate such discrimination claims.83 If a compliance review reveals
noncompliance (that is within OCR’s jurisdiction), OCR first attempts to reach a
voluntary agreement to remedy the discrimination.84 However, if the covered entity
does not voluntarily resolve the issue in a satisfactory manner, OCR will issue a
Letter of Findings to outline why the entity is noncompliant and OCR’s next steps
(including referral to DOJ for enforcement steps to terminate federal financial
assistance).85 Since the implementation of Section 1557, there have only been fiftyeight publicly available resolutions.86 A few examples:
● Touro Infirmary Emergency Department of Louisiana (sex discrimination):
OCR investigated a claim after a patient alleged he was denied appropriate
care and treatment after a domestic violence incident, and was subject to
rude comments based on his gender (male).87
82

See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Section 1557: Coverage of Health Insurance in Marketplaces
and Other Health Plans, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section1557/fs-health-insurance/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). Not covered, however, are third
party administrators of self-insured plans. See 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 3,1432 (May 18, 2016)
(“Third party administrators are generally not responsible for the benefit design of the self-insured
plans they administer and that ERISA (and likely the contracts into which third party
administrators enter with the plan sponsors) requires plans to be administered consistent with their
terms.”).
83

See Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,775 (June 23, 2000), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 2000d
(complaint procedures); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, How OCR Enforces Civil Rights
Discrimination Laws and Regulations, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/forproviders/compliance-enforcement/enforcement-process/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).
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Id.
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Id.
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For a list of recent Resolution Agreements by OCR, see OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Recent Civil
Rights Resolution Agreements & Compliance Reviews, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civilrights/for-providers/compliance-enforcement/agreements/index.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
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See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OCR Enforcement under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care
Act Sex Discrimination Case, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-
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● Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (PDHS) (discrimination on
the basis of nationality—limited English proficiency): OCR investigated
two complaints regarding access to programs in the PDHS Office of Income
Maintenance by individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP) because
they did not receive appropriate language services and were thus hindered
from obtaining benefits in a timely manner.88
● Mid-Maryland Muskoskeletal Institute (MMI) (disability discrimination):
OCR received a complaint that MMI violated Section 1557 by
discriminating against the complainant and her minor son on the basis of
their deafness because MMI failed to provide a qualified sign language
interpreter.89
● Office of African American Children’s Services (OAACS) (race
discrimination): OCR received a complaint regarding OAACS’s use of
“racial classifications as the sole factor in determining which children” in a
region of Washington state received child protective and welfare services
in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.90
Like most healthcare statutes, Section 1557 presents a significant
compliance responsibility for covered entities. OCR has not yet investigated any
discrimination complaints regarding the use of AI by a covered entity, nor has it
issued any guidance about how it might treat discrimination that originates from
AI. Absent such information, covered entities can use the existing Voluntary
Resolution Agreements as a starting point when developing their compliance
programs.
As AI continues to permeate the healthcare industry, covered entities will
need to revise their written policies and procedures to ensure that their existing
nondiscrimination policies extend to AI usage. For example, if AI systems are used
to identify certain patients as being victims of domestic violence, there should be
1557/ocr-enforcement-section-1557-aca-sex-discrimination/index.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016)
(sex discrimination) [hereinafter OCR Enforcement of Touro Infirmary].
88

VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS. 2 (2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-padhs-vra.pdf (discrimination based on race, ethnicity
or national origin) [hereinafter OCR ENFORCEMENT OF PDHS].
89

VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND MID-MARYLAND MUSKOSKELETAL INSTITUTE 2 (2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/MMI-vra.pdf (discrimination on the basis of disability)
[hereinafter OCR ENFORCEMENT OF MMI].
90

VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, AND THE
WASHINGTON STATE DEP’T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVS. 1 (2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/oaacs_ra.pdf (discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or
national origin) [hereinafter OCR ENFORCEMENT OF OAACS]. OCR received this complaint prior
to the passage of Section 1557, however, the agency uses this as an example of how it enforces the
regulation for instances of race-based discrimination.
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policies to ensure that the system’s identification is gender neutral.91 Similarly,
covered entities can develop criteria for their AI that reflect nondiscrimination
principles and ensure that the software they purchase, create, or commission meets
their requirements. For example, covered entities can create assessment criteria for
AI that is used to identify patients who would benefit from auxiliary aids for their
disabilities (e.g., to ensure those with rare disabilities are not excluded) or from
interpretation services because they are limited English proficient (e.g., to ensure
that those who speak less common languages can still access an interpreter).92
Entities must also consider designating a nondiscrimination coordinator
specifically for their AI usage to effectuate and oversee these policies.93
Importantly, covered entities should continue to monitor AI
determinations—in both clinical and administrative purposes—to identify patterns
of disparate impact. Review of AI decisions should be incorporated into entities’
scheduled audit plans and should be done regularly. In addition to looking factors
such as data-privacy or error-rates, these audits must include a review of
discrimination patterns.94 To protect against confirmation-bias by covered entities’
officers and executives, they should also hire external auditors.95 Third-party
contractors will be particularly useful for auditing AI usage because the entities’
internal officers likely do not possess the requisite computer-science background
to review the source codes to identify which data elements are contributing to the
disparate impact. Monitoring and auditing alone is of course insufficient; covered
entities must also develop strategic plans to timely remedy any biases they discover
and should cease use of the AI until the discriminatory effects can be eliminated
with some certainty.96 Not only will this internal-remedy approach reflect covered
91

See, e.g., OCR Enforcement of Touro Infirmary, supra note 87 (requiring Touro Infirmary
Emergency Department of Louisiana to revise its protocol to reflect-gender neutral procedures
around domestic violence incidents).
92

See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF MMI, supra note 89, at 9 (requiring the Institute to use
specific factors created by OCR to prioritize patients requiring auxiliary aids and qualified
interpreters).
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See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF PDHS, supra note 88, at 7 (requiring the Pennsylvania agency
to designate a “language assistance coordinator” in light of an investigation). See also 42 C.F.R.
§ 92.7(a) (2019) (stating that covered entities of more than fifteen employees are already required
to designate someone to oversee its Section 1557 program).
94

See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF OAACS, supra note 90, at 4 (requiring the state office to
conduct follow up assessments on its newly developed race-neutral policies).
95

See STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, supra note 66, at 3 (“When possible, that
quantitative data should be audited by an agency or institution independent from actors within the
system to avoid biased statistical reporting.”).
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See id. at 3 (“If the use of a particular pretrial risk assessment instrument by itself does not result
in an independently audited, measurable decrease in the number of people detained pretrial, the
tool should be pulled from use until it is recalibrated to cause demonstrably decarceral results.”).
While some scholars speculate that attempts to remedy disparate impact by intentionally rebalancing AI in favor of groups that have historically been marginalized will run afoul the
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entities commitment to nondiscrimination, “voluntary action” is also the preferred
remedy under Section 1557 regulations.97
To ensure that these nondiscrimination policies are in effect on the ground,
providers (e.g., physicians, nurses) and administrative staff (e.g., medical billers,
intake and discharge staff, and even personnel working in the social services offices
at hospitals and clinics) need to be trained on Section 1557.98 As of now, AI in
healthcare does not have primacy—human beings are still able and expected to
review the AI’s predictions and decide how to proceed. Covered entities need to
clarify what conduct is not permitted (e.g., accepting AI determinations without
additional review) and consistently discipline staff who violate the AInondiscrimination policies.99 This human aspect should be more than a last-line-ofdefense to detect medical or coding errors, but should also recognize discrimination
under Section 1557. For example, if an AI makes a prediction based on a patients’
answer to a questionnaire, then the medical staff should recognize that such
prediction might run afoul Section 1557 if the patient did not receive interpreter
services if the patient is LEP.
A hallmark of a robust compliance program is an effective reporting and
complaint mechanism. Covered entities should already have anonymous reporting
Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. Stefano, others argue that fixing AI to avoid foreseeable
disparate impact liability is permissible. Compare Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 694–95 (2017) (“The holding in Ricci suggests that we cannot solely rely
on auditing for legal reasons . . . If an agency runs an algorithm that has a disparate impact,
correcting those results after the fact will trigger the same kind of analysis as New Haven's
rejection of its firefighter test results.”), with Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for
Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 130 (2017–18)
(arguing that Ricci does not compel such strict barriers and as long as an agency can foresee
disparate impact through “a strong belief in evidence” it can adopt a less biased policy if it does
not require taking a benefit away from the individuals who received it under the original policy).
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Additionally, it would be wise to involve corporate counsel in the ongoing monitoring of
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regular contact with benefits applicants on interpreter-services policies); OCR ENFORCEMENT OF
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(requiring the state office to train all staff on Title VI and internal nondiscrimination obligations).
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lines and enforced anti-retaliation policies (for internal whistleblowers);100 it should
be clear to employees, senior officers, and vendors that these mechanisms can also
receive Section 1557 complaints. Similarly, covered entities should implement
grievance procedures (for patients) to report possible Section 1557 violations when
AI is used to make treatment decisions, billing activities, etc. relating to a patient.101
One can question the usefulness of reporting mechanisms when most of an AI’s
decision-making is made behind a digital curtain—will patients even know if
they’ve been discriminated against? In order to make grievance procedures for
patients meaningful, covered entities should (a) notify patients when AI is used in
relation to them and (b) explicitly advertise the grievance procedures where patients
are likely to see them.102
A criticism of implementing compliance policies around Section 1557-AI
claims is that covered entities can use their robust policy as a shield in OCR
investigations. Given that healthcare AI is still (relatively) in its infancy and that
OCR has not yet addressed it, OCR may defer to covered entities’ interpretation of
appropriate Section 1557 compliance in this realm. This can lead to the obvious
pitfall of OCR never engaging in meaningful review of discrimination when AI is
used. One method of combatting this is of course for the healthcare industry to set
a high standard for itself; covered entities should properly vet the AI developers
they partner with to ensure they incorporate Section 1557 principles in their original
designs.103
From the perspective of a covered entity, Section 1557 is an important legal
obligation for one major reason: failure to comply can lead to termination of federal
financial assistance.104 In most cases, loss of such assistance is fatal to the continued
existence of the covered entity.105 However, the threat of Section 1557 enforcement
100
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lacks the oomph that other healthcare enforcement actions carry. When OCR
investigations result in Voluntary Resolution Agreements, if the party fails to
substantially comply with the Agreement, the result is that the “parties will confer
and attempt to reach agreement as to what steps may be necessary to resolve the
compliance issues to both parties’ satisfaction.”106 Compare this with enforcement
threats in other areas of healthcare—such as fraud and abuse laws—where the
failure to comply with the law is met with hefty fines.107
Moreover, OCR’s enforcement of Section 1557 has been relatively sparse
and limited in scope—particularly under the Trump Administration.108 In mid2019, the Department of Health and Human Services proposed “substantial
revisions” to Section 1557—namely eliminating protection of transgender
individuals, adopting blanket religious freedom exemptions for providers, and
weakening protections for individuals with limited English proficiency.109
Conscience and religious freedom were the main focal points of OCR under the
Trump Administration, beginning with Trump’s Executive Order “Promoting Free
Speech and Religious Liberty”110 and the creation of the Conscience and Religious
Freedom Division within OCR.111 By their own report, enforcing civil rights was
only about a quarter of OCR’s workload, and the majority of that time has focused
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on the conscience rights rule.112 Enforcement of Section 1557 is necessary because
it can prevent and remedy discrimination at “every step in the healthcare system,
from obtaining insurance coverage to receiving a proper diagnosis and
treatment.”113 The limited nature of OCR enforcement of Section 1557 generally
may lead patients to feel unprotected by the agency when AI is used.
B. Section 1557: Private Right of Action
Healthcare consumers themselves have a private right of action under
Section 1557 for allegations of intentional discrimination, giving them the ability
to file a lawsuit against a covered entity directly rather than filing a complaint with
OCR. To state a claim under Section 1557, plaintiffs must show that they (1) were
a member of a protected class, (2) qualified for the benefit/program at issue, (3)
suffered an adverse action, and (4) the adverse action gave rise to an inference of
discrimination.114
However, there is a circuit split as to whether Section 1557 provides for a
private right of action for disparate-impact claims. Some courts have permitted
disparate-impact liability for all grounds prohibited under Section 1557; they justify
that it would lead to absurd and inconsistent results if only some plaintiffs could
proceed without a showing of intentional discrimination.115 Other courts, however,
have held that Section 1557 allows for disparate impact liability only where the
originating statutory basis provided for it.116 Recall that Section 1557 incorporates
different civil rights statutes (e.g., Civil Rights Act), not all of which allow for
actions under a disparate-impact theory.117 Despite the fact the OCR issued a
guidance letter explicitly stating that the agency recognized a private right of action
for disparate impact discrimination, these courts argue that the letter is clearly
112
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contrary to Congress’s intent and does not deserve Chevron deference.118 Judge
Sutton’s commentary in Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee sums up the
mindset of these courts: “Treating similarly situated people differently goes to the
heart of invidious discrimination. But treating differently situated people differently
usually counts as equal justice under law.”119
Due to the circuit split on disparate-impact liability for Section 1557, claims
can be fatal for many individuals seeking relief through a private lawsuit for
discrimination they faced because of healthcare AI. As the UnitedHealth case study
reported, factors related to a suspect class (in that case, race) are not expected to be
explicitly included in the AI’s algorithm; yet biases can enter and manifest through
other factors (in that case, cost history).120 The types of claims that private plaintiffs
might pursue will clearly fit the definition of disparate-impact liability—i.e.,
facially neutral policies that have a discriminatory effect. In the circuits where
disparate-impact liability is not always permitted, patients seeking redress for the
effects of AI biases on racial grounds are unlikely to prevail.121
Even in the states that do permit disparate-impact liability—or in the rare
cases where a patient can show intentional discrimination—the odds of plaintiffs
prevailing are low. Section 1557 lawsuits are few and far in between.122 When
brought, they are often decided in favor of the healthcare covered entity.123 As a
result, patients who feel the brunt of bias in healthcare AI have little hope for
recourse under Section 1557 complaints to OCR or private lawsuits.
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V.

COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES
A. Licensing

Federal agencies, such as the FDA or OCR in Health and Human Services,
do not have authority to regulate healthcare providers themselves—that task is left
to the states. Various state medical licensing boards regulate the practice of
medicine by physicians, as well as nurses and technicians. While the Federation of
State Medical Boards similarly recognizes the need for regulation around AI,124
state licensing boards may not be able to regulate AI because it fails to meet the
most basic hook for their authority—practice of medicine.125 As of now, physicians
maintain primacy; it is presumed that the AI does not make decisions, it simply
recommends them.126
Licensed physicians are held to certain standards of conduct based on
ethical guidelines (transparency, truthfulness) and legal obligations (reasonable
care, confidentiality, informed consent).127 Nearly all medical professionals are
required to participate in continuing education (CE) hours as well in order to
maintain their license; some states require certain professionals to take CE hours
related to a subject of cultural competency (e.g., LGBTQ, HIV/AIDS).128 Federal
guidelines fill in gaps where states have not developed such standards. For example,
OCR’s Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting
Limited English Proficient Persons,129 or the Office of Minority Health’s National
Standard for Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services (CLAS) in Health
124
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and Health Care.130 While neither comprehensive nor necessarily binding, the
guidance and CE requirements still ensure that there is at least some understanding
of health disparities in certain communities. There is no guarantee that such
guidelines are applied consistently or uniformly, but there is something to be said
about human element behind traditional healthcare.131
In the context of pretrial detainment decisions, advocacy groups
recommend that courts abide by an AI determinations only if it recommends release
(and if the algorithm does not recommend immediate release, it should recommend
a pretrial hearing involving rigorous safeguards).132 Borrowing from this approach,
state licensing boards can write their policies to ensure that that if AI is used, it is
used only in contexts with the lowest potential for harm (e.g., for treatment
maintenance, but not diagnosis; or to diagnose common colds, but not cancers). In
line with this least-approach harm, providers should include in their compliance
program that providers can follow diagnostic AI determinations if it does make a
diagnosis, but if the AI does not make a diagnosis there should be a rigorous
independent review by the physician to protect against delayed diagnosis.133
B. Malpractice Liability
Traditional tort liability for medical malpractice also extends to
discrimination by healthcare providers. There are mountains of evidence—both
statistical and anecdotal—of discrimination against patients based on their race,
gender, disability and other characteristics. For example, physicians overestimate
pain tolerance of patients of color, leading to systemic undertreatment.134 Female
patients similarly have their symptoms downplayed by physicians, and patients
belonging to more than one marginalized group experience compounding
discrimination.135 Providers can be held liable for providing inferior treatment,
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misdiagnosing, or denying care to patients based on their protected
characteristics—whether intentional or unintentional.136 The existence of tort
liability for discriminatory treatment by providers raises the question: Is
discrimination by healthcare AI a cause of action for medical practice?
Scholars and healthcare providers alike recognize that the use of AI in
healthcare, particularly for clinical decision-making, does not amount to
“substitution” of the provider’s role.137 Regardless of a physician’s reliance on AI,
the responsibility of clinical decision-making lies with the physician: The AI does
not practice medicine.138
Physicians can be subject to tort liability when their diagnosis and treatment
decisions fall below the standard of the customary practice.139 Where any new
practices are used, it is naturally difficult for the physician to establish that she
comported with “custom.”140 When AI is used and results in injury to a patient (e.g.,
from misdiagnosis), particularly injury arising from a bias, is the physician liable
for the AI’s decision? To date, no court has applied the physician liability standard
where AI was at issue.141 Similar to the challenges created by lack of regulation,
lack of tort precedent around healthcare AI creates a compliance challenge for
providers.
Malpractice litigation around healthcare AI may center on the established
safety and quality of the technology. Nicholas Terry points out that in many
domains, automated technology is expected or even preferred (e.g., automation in
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commercial airlines).142 However, the FDA has issued guidance (read warnings)
stating that the “safety and effectiveness” of certain robotic devices—such as
robotically-assisted surgical devices in mastectomy and cancer treatments—has not
been established.143 Where AI technology is untested (or has been shown to have
negative biases), providers should avoid using them in their clinical decisions or
consult with the relevant agencies for advisory opinions. Healthcare entities should
engage in regular and thorough review to ensure the technology they opt for is not
later revealed to have discriminatory effects.
Moreover, physicians are still expected to have ultimate review of their AI’s
clinical determinations. Regardless of advancements in AI, it is unlikely that courts
will permit patients to bring malpractice lawsuits against the AI system. Therefore,
malpractice litigation may apply scope-of-practice doctrines to AI, such as by
allowing AI to make decisions under a physician’s “standing orders” (i.e., an
algorithm).144 Another analysis courts might use is to treat physicians’ use of AI as
legitimate consultation with an expert.145 For example, when AI is used to make a
radiology decision under this approach, the physician must establish that the AI is
properly “trained,” used a patient’s specific clinical history and findings to reach
its decision, identified similar cases, and can “point” to the relevant parts of a
patient’s scan.146 Ultimately, AI may advance to the point that using AI is
customary practice and drawing analogies to expert-consultations is
unnecessary.147 An additional compliance challenge may arise from the fact that
there are multiple entities in the distribution chain of healthcare AI, including the
manufacturer that creates it (products liability), to the hospitals and clinics that
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adopt it (facilities and equipment), and to the physicians that use and review its
decisions (malpractice).148
Tort liability presents many risks for providers, so their compliance
programs seek to mitigate such risks (e.g., through reporting mechanisms). Given
the numerous open questions presented in this section, healthcare providers should,
again, take a cautious approach. Since the law treats providers as having primacy,
they should always thoroughly review all AI determinations—whether it is a new
decision (e.g., an initial diagnosis, or new treatment plan) or a decision to make no
change to the patient’s treatment, diagnosis, or prescription. Reviewing even these
seemingly low-risk decisions is important from the provider’s perspective because
even a decision to do nothing is still a decision for which the physician can be liable.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Thus far, this Article has discussed what is lacking in terms of
antidiscrimination in healthcare AI. The FDA’s enforcement is only emerging and
does not fully capture the potential for discriminatory effects by AI. Section 1557,
while binding on covered entities, has taken a backseat to OCR’s other enforcement
efforts, and private rights of action are largely unavailable to patients seeking
disparate-impact liability. Additionally, OCR has been silent on the applicability of
Section 1557 on the use of AI tools. And state licensing boards lack the statutory
hook to govern the way healthcare providers rely on AI. A new approach is
necessary to ensure that nondiscrimination is a valued legal principle in healthcare
AI, two questions remain: What is the right approach? And who will enforce it?
A. Industry Standards and Internal Compliance
It would be wise to require nondiscrimination at the start—at AI
development. One method would be for the AI industry to adopt its own standards
that reflect nondiscrimination. In the absence of legal obligations, some scholars
suggest private companies adopt internal standards to reflect an ethical approach to
creating AI.149 This can take the form of internal standards (e.g., Facebook, IBM,
Microsoft) or standards set forth by professional associations (e.g., Association for
the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Association of Computing Machinery,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers).150 Some organizations, like the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ 2016 report, “Ethically Aligned
Design,” emphasized “human norms and values” and “value sensitive or value148
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based design.”151 The British Computer Society’s code of conduct requires
individuals must “promote equal access to the benefit of IT and promote the
inclusion of all sectors of society whenever opportunities raise.”152 These principles
can (and should) be adopted by trade organizations of AI developers and should be
incorporated into the codes of conduct, policies and procedures, and human impact
statements of individual AI companies.
Google, for example, lists its principles and objectives for its AI products
publicly. One such objective is to “avoid creating or reinforcing unfair bias.”153
AI algorithms and datasets can reflect, reinforce, or reduce unfair
biases. We recognize that distinguishing fair from unfair biases is
not always simple and differs across cultures and societies. We will
seek to avoid unjust impacts on people, particularly those related to
sensitive characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, nationality,
income, sexual orientation, ability, and political or religious
belief.154
IBM similarly includes “fairness” as an element in its “Five Areas of Ethical
Focus.”
AI provides deeper insight into our personal lives when interacting
with our sensitive data. As humans are inherently vulnerable to
biases, and are responsible for building AI, there are chances for
human bias to be embedded in the systems we create. It is the role
of a responsible team to minimize algorithmic bias through ongoing
research and data collection which is representative of a diverse
population.155
Since not all bias can be eliminated from AI decision-making (despite the
data-vetting methods discussed in Part III(A)), healthcare entities must consider
methods to counterbalance bias in their compliance programs. Under industry
standards, manufacturer’s may already be expected to engage in independent
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review of their products for validity and quality;156 such standards can be expanded
to require independent review for biases. Key to achieving the nondiscrimination
principles discussed here will be transparency—entities should develop their own
factors for ensuring that information about their AI technology is readily available
to patients, providers, and regulators. This information may include (1) a
description of the AI’s design and testing, (2) the elements on which the AI makes
predictions, the weights assigned to those elements, and (3) the source of the
training dataset and the “outcome data” used to validate the AI.157 This level of
transparency will not only assist regulators to better understand the landscape of
healthcare AI and develop future regulations, but it also provides patients with a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the use of AI if they experience harmful
effects.
While the opportunity to challenge is highly recommended as a counterbalance method to AI bias in other industries (e.g., criminal justice),158 the
opportunity to file for a hearing will not help a patient who has been incorrectly
diagnosed by a physician or whose coverage has been denied by an insurer.159
Patients (and their lawyers) are not versed in medicine, they do not possess the
necessary expertise to dispute the correctness of medical diagnosis or
appropriateness of a treatment plan, particularly to effectively argue that AI bias
played a role in those decisions. Healthcare entities should consider methods to
make the AI open to a meaningful challenge, such as implementing a panel where
a harmed patient and her counsel can access professional medical opinions to build
their case.160 Additionally, covered entities should consider other methods to
counterbalance the effects of bias in healthcare AI when it is used—such as a
rebuttable presumption against the AI decision or de novo review of its decisions
when a patient challenges an AI determination.
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B. Recommended Regulations and a “Super Regulation”
Some argue that regulators, not private companies, should take the lead in
developing policies around AI-informed tools.161 The findings in the UnitedHealth
case study should indicate to the AI industry that companies need to be robust in
their nondiscrimination assessments—merely cutting out factors such as race or
disability is insufficient to eliminate disparate-impact to those characteristics.162
Professor Sean K. Hallisey suggests an “AI Data Transparency Model” that shifts
the focus from regulating the AI algorithms and developers towards regulating the
data itself through auditing and certification requirements.163 The FDA can adopt
guidelines (or add guidelines to its proposed frameworks) that reflect
nondiscrimination standards in the SaMD and CDS which it approves. However,
the descriptor “medical device”—the hook for FDA regulation—fails to fully
capture the cognitive-like characterization of AI.164 As discussed earlier, the FDA’s
limited authority would still leave healthcare AI that is used for billing or other
administrative purposes unregulated.
Another approach is to regulate the usage of AI, as opposed to its creation.
There are some bases to find that state licensing boards have authority to regulate
healthcare AI: (1) future AI, particularly diagnostic and procedural ones, may
actually be able to practice medicine and (2) other doctrines permit licensure
regulations, particularly the corporate practice of medicine and scope of practice
(SOP).165 SOP guidelines for nurse practitioners who, depending on jurisdiction,
can diagnose and treat with or without physician involvement can be used as a
model for SOP around healthcare AI.166 The application of SOP doctrine leads to
161
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an interesting questions: If an AI is “licensable” to what extent can it practice and
be developed for one purpose and be tasked for another?
Finally, some scholars suggest an entirely new regulatory regime—perhaps
even the creation of a new agency—to oversee development of all AI technology
(not just healthcare) through a “super regulator” or a third-party auditing
mechanism.167 “There are ways to minimize bias and unfairness in pretrial risk
assessment, but it requires proper guidance and oversight.”168 California Senate Bill
10 is an example of an effort to regulate AI that fell short. The Bill sought to
implement AI for pretrial sentencing determinations, but it lacked governance
about proper oversight, calculating risk levels, or methods to protect against biased
outcomes.169
A super-regulation may resolve some of these concerns by governing AI
technology from its initial inception in the IRB review process (e.g., ensuring the
training data is unbiased), through FDA clearance (e.g., testing to ensure quality
and nondiscriminatory effects), all the way up to implementation and use by
healthcare entities (e.g., appropriate review by providers and compliance with
Section 1557). Nicholas Terry proposes three characteristics of a regulatory matrix
for AI: Unitary, holistic, and universal.170 These characteristics applied to the
nondiscrimination principles addressed here can create an entirely new regulatory
regime for healthcare AI:
● Unitary. Rather than separating AI device and practice of medicine using
AI, a regulatory framework can address both in tandem;
● Holistic. A regulatory framework for AI can address the nondiscrimination
concerns discussed here, as well as other criticisms (e.g., quality and safety,
transparency, data protection, and cost effectiveness);
● Universal. A universal approach will ensure that clinical and administrative
uses of AI are not treated differently, and that different healthcare entities
(e.g., hospitals and insurers) are not treated differently. Relatedly, the superregulation would apply to all healthcare entities regardless of whether they
receive federal funds. Given the growing use of AI and potential for datasharing, a universal regulation could also protect nondiscrimination if the
data contained in AI leaves the healthcare domain.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

“Against this historical backdrop [of racial imbalance], it is imperative that
pretrial risk assessment instruments, if used at all, be designed to help meet the
goal of reducing racial disparities . . . . If a tool cannot help achieve that goal,
then it is not a tool that the justice system needs.”171
The quote above is from a statement released by over 100 advocacy
organizations in response to California Senate Bill 10, a legislation that essentially
approved the use of AI in the criminal justice context.172 As emphasized throughout
this Article, AI-informed decision-making is emerging in nearly every industry.
From determinations made by the government (e.g., public benefits) to those made
by private actors (e.g., employers), researchers and advocates are concerned about
the discriminatory effects inherent in AI. AI used in the healthcare context,
however, presents a unique challenge: these biases can permeate the intimate nature
of the examination room or operating room.
This Article discussed the effects of AI bias from a legal and compliance
standpoint. The existing nondiscrimination responsibilities on healthcare entities
through Section 1557 of the ACA are likely to extend to healthcare AI. Similarly,
licensing requirements and the threat of malpractice liability will continue to hold
physicians to a standard of care when using AI, one that does not condone
discrimination. However, those responsibilities do not govern the design and
development of AI—where bias is most likely to be imbedded. As discussed in this
Article, the FDA’s enforcement authority is currently too limited to adequately
oversee all types of healthcare AI and is unlikely to address discrimination.
The promise of AI is attractive: Faster, less costly, and more accurate
decision-making. Advocates of healthcare AI technology argue that it has the
potential to reduce errors resulting from human variation by physicians.173 In fact,
these advocates argue that AI has the potential to eliminate, rather than introduce
or perpetuate, biases in healthcare because it can be programmed to not be
influenced by external information about patients or their finances.174 AI even
presents a novel opportunity to remedy many health disparities. For example, AI
171
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could be used as a tool in psychiatry to diagnose or treat individuals with severe
mental illness.175
But the “promise” of AI is misleading. Without a comprehensive
(legislative, regulatory, or industry standard) framework that addresses biases in
AI, patients that have historically not benefited from the healthcare industry will
continue to face discrimination—engrained systemic biases, will only become
solidified, automated ones. Patients belonging to suspect classes or low-socioeconomic communities have historically been excluded from the benefits of the
American healthcare system,176 and patients have little reason to trust to
automation.177 As AI explodes as a clinical and administrative tool,
nondiscrimination principles should be at the center of regulators’ and the
industries’ plans.
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